

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 2249

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PEPR, MASS TU, US
SUBJ: TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS: JAVITS-ECEVIT CONVERSATION

1. SEN. JAVITS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR PETER LAKELAND AND BY DCM MET SEPARATELY WITH TURK FONMIN OKCUN AND PRIME MIN ECEVIT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS EARLY EVENING ARRIVAL MARCH 24 IN ANKARA. THE INITIAL CONVERSATION WITH OKCUN WAS SHORT WITH JAVITS EXPLAINING TO HIM THE ANGER OVER CYPRUS IN CONGRESS THREE YEARS AGO, BUT INDICATING THAT MOOD OF CONGRESS WAS CHANGING AND EMPHASIZING THAT HE UNDERSTOOD STRONG TURKISH FEELING ABOUT LINKAGE OF EMBARGO AND CYPRUS. OKCUN REPLIED BY NOTING THAT US WEAPONS HAD BEEN USED BY ISRAEL IN SOUTH LEBANON BUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO RESENTMENT IN THE CONGRESS. JAVITS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS SOME PARALLEL BUT FELT THE SITUATIONS WERE DIFFERENT. "YOUR ACTION WAS PREMPTIVE WHILE THE ISRAELI ACTION WAS IN RETALIATION AND THEREFORE MORE CLEARCUT." JAVITS ADDED THAT THE ISRAELI SITUATION WOULD HELP THE TURKISH CASE WHEN THE CONGRESS CAME TO DEALING WITH THE SITUATION.

2. EXPANDING ON THIS THEME JAVITS STRESSED HIS HOPES FOR A SETTLEMENT OF US-TURKISH DIFFERENCES AND
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HIS HOPE THAT CONGRESS COULD BE "BROUGHT AROUND." HE NOTED THAT BOTH THE FORD AND CARTER ADMINISTRATIONS HAD BEEN EAGER TO HAVE THE DCA APPROVED BUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN A PROBLEM IN THE CONGRESS. HE SAID "OUR COMMITTEE DID NOT WANT TO TAKE UP THE DCA BECAUSE WE THOUGHT IT WOULD FAIL." HE BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD MAKE A STRONG

CASE IN THE CONGRESS THIS SPRING AND THE DCA WOULD PASS. HE HOPED THERE WOULD BE NO TURKS ACTIONS TAKEN IN ANGER THAT WOULD INTERFERE WITH THIS PROCESS.

3. OKCUN REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF TURKISH ANGER, THE TURKS JUST WANTED THINGS PUT IN THEIR PLACE. THE QUESTION IS, HE SAID: "DOES THE US WANT A STRONG TURKEY IN THE MIDDLE EAST?"

4. JAVITS REPLIED THAT CONSTANT US POLICY OVER MANY YEARS HAD BEEN TO BUTTRESS A MILITARILY STRONG TURKEY ON NATO'S SOUTHEASTERN FLANK. HE, HIMSELF, HAD ALWAYS SUPPORTED THIS. IN HIS OPINION THINGS WENT OFF THE TRACK BECAUSE OF TURKISH NATIONAL PRIDE AND US EXASPERATION. TURKEY WAS, HOWEVER, CRITICAL TO THE FREE WORLD AND IT WAS TIME TO GET THINGS BACK ON THE TRACK.

5. OKCUN OBSERVED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT NEITHER FOREIGN POLICY NOR NATIONAL INTEREST BE AFFECTED BY "PROVINCIAL CONSIDERATIONS", NOR BY "CERTAIN STRATAS OF SOCIETY." JAVITS AGREED BUT ADDED THAT UNDER DEMOCRACY POLICY WAS INEVITABLY AFFECTED BY DIFFERENT GROUPS.

6. JAVITS CONTINUED " BUT THIS IS A CRISIS; YOU LAY
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ASIDE SMALL CONSIDERATIONS." THIS WAS THE OPPORTUNE MOMENT FOR TURKEY TO MAKE A NEW START. THE DCA WAS A GOOD APPROACH BECAUSE IT WAS RECIPROCAL. OKCUN QUESTION WHETHER THE DCA WAS REALLY RECIPROCAL POINTING OUT THAT TURKEY HAD NO BASES IN THE US.

7. JAVITS REPLIED THE DCA WAS RECIPROCAL BECAUSE OF THE JOINT COOPERATION IT IMPLIED. JAVITS, IN AN APPARENT CONTINUING REFERENCE TO THE DCA, SAID THAT NOW WAS THE TIME TO BREAK NEW GROUND. IT WAS BETTER TO APPROVE A NEW DEAL THAN GO BACK TO SOMETHING THAT CAUSED A STRAIN. THE CONVERSTAION ENDED ON THAT NOTE.

8. JAVITS ACCOMPANIED BY LAKELAND AND DCM THEN WENT IMMEDIATELY TO PRIME MINISTER'S HOUSE WHERE SENATOR COMMENCED SUBSTANTIVE PART OF CONVERSATION BY TELLING PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT THAT HE HAD VIEWS ON TURKISH-AMERICAN PROBLEMS BUT HE PREFERRED PRIME MINISTER GIVE HIS VIEWS FIRST IF HE WERE WILLING. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD TALKED TO PRESIDENT CARTER JUST BEFORE

LEAVING AND THAT PRESIDENT HAD ASKED HIM TO GIVE
PRIME MINISTER HIS WAR PERSONAL REGARDS.

9. PRIME MINISTER TOLD JAVITS THAT WHEN HE HAD
TAKEN OVER THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HE HAD SAID
IMMEDIATELY AND PUBLICLY THAT THE TURKISH SIDE
WOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE AND MAKE PROPOSALS ON
CYPRUS--BOTH ON DEMARCATION AND CONSTITUTION.
THE TURKS WOULD NOT WAIT ON THE US CONGRESS. IT
WAS MAINLY A PROBLEM THAT CONCERNED TURKS AND GREEKS.
HE HAD SAID THE SAME THING TO WALDHEIM AND SECRETARY
VANCE. HE HAD MADE ONE VERY IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL
POINT TO VANCE: AS LONG AS GREEK CYPRIOTS BELIEVED
THEY COULD RELY ON US PRESSURE ON TURKEY THEY
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WOULD BE INTRANSIGENT. THEY WERE NOT MUCH INTER-
ESTED IN A FEDERAL SOLUTION BUT WANTED THE STATUS
QUO ANTE. HE HAD ASSURED VANCE AS WELL AS WALDHEIM
THAT HE WOULD NOT USE TURKISH RESENTMENT OVER THE
EMBARGO AS AN EXCUSE TO DELAY. BUT HE HAD ASKED
THAT THE US NOT MAKE A LINKAGE BETWEEN THE DCA
AND CYPRUS. HE BELIEVED THAT HE HAD BEEN PROMISED
THAT THE USG WOULD NOT MAKE SUCH A LINKAGE. HE WAS,
THEREFORE, GREATLY DISILLUSIONED AT THE ADMINISTRATION'S
SUBSEQUENT POSITION. THIS WAS REVEALED FIRST OF ALL
WHEN 19 MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
COMMITTEE SENT A LETTER TO THE SECRETARY ON FEB. 14
(AND HE DESCRIBED CONTENTS OF LETTER). THE TURKS
LEARNED OF THE LETTER ON 8 MARCH WHEN IT WAS
PUBLISHED. THEY WERE ASTONISHED TO FIND OUT THAT THE
ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT EVEN ANSWERED THE LETTER BY
THEN. TURKS HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE THAT THE
ADMINISTRATION WAS LOOKING FOR HOPEFUL SIGNS IN THE
CONGRESS SO THAT IT COULD BEGIN PROCESS TO GET RID OF
THE EMBARGO. NOW THESE MEN " SOME OF WHOM HAVE BEEN
IN GREEK LOBBY" (SIC) WERE ASKING FOR AN UNEQUIVOCAL
SIGN FROM THE ADMINISTRATION AND NOT GETTING IT.
THE NEXT DAY SECRETARY VANCE HAD ANSWERED A QUESTION IN A
SENATE COMMITTEE MAKING A DIRECT LINK NOT ONLY
BETWEEN THE DCA AND CYPRUS BUT ALSO BETWEEN THE
DCA AND THE MONTREUX MEETING. THIS HAD HAD A VERY
BAD EFFECT ON THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. ECEVIT HAD
FEARED, MOREOVER, THAT IT WOULD ENDANGER THE
MONTREUX MEETING BUT FORTUNATELY KARAMANLIS HAD BEEN
A MATURE ENOUGH STATESMAN NOT TO ALLOW THAT TO
HAPPEN.

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10. ECEVIT DESCRIBED REPORTS HE HAD OF EXTENSIVE GREEK CYPRIOT LOBBYING IN THE US, AND HIS RESULTING DISQUIET. HE REITERATED THAT LIMITED OBJECTIVES HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AT MONTREUX AND THAT HE WAS REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC REGARDING TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS. HE WAS NOT SO OPTIMISTIC, HOWEVER, ABOUT CYPRUS BECAUSE OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS ATTITUDE AND HE WAS ACCUTELY CONSCIOUS THAT FAILURE TO ACHIEVE MOVEMENT ON CYPRUS WOULD IN TURN POISON TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS WHICH WERE HIS PRIMARY CONCERN.

11. JAVITS REPLIED THAT "THE TIGER WAS AT THE GATES." STRESSING THAT HE HAD NOT TALKED TO SECRETARY VANCE, NOR WAS HE SPEAKING FOR THE USG, BUT AS AN INDIVIDUAL SENATOR, HE ASID: "THIS IS A NEW MOMENT; WE MUST NOT OPEN OLD WONDS." BY ACTING ON THE DCA THE CONGRESS COULD REMOVE THE EMBARGO WITHOUT OPENING THE OLD ARGUMENTS. "STRATEGY HAS SHIFTED; THIS IS A WAY TO GET ACTION TO NULIFY PREVIOUS HISTORY." HE SURMISED THAT SECRETARY VANCE, WHO HE KNEW TO BE A STRONG FRIEND OF TURKEY, IN SPEAKING OFF THE CUFF IN THE SENATE WAS TALKING ABOUT THE " OLD SITUATION," I.E. THE EMBARGO AND THE REASONS FOR IT. HE WAS NOT ADDRESSING THE NEW, I.E. THE DCA. JAVITS SAID HE DIDN'T BLAME ECEVIT FOR BEING
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ANGRY, BUT THE THING TO DO NOW WAS FOR EVERYBODY TO PUSH THE DCA. HE SAID "PEOPLE WILL VOTE TO PASS THE DCA WHO WILL NOT VOTE TO LIFT THE EMBARGO."

THE EMBARGO WAS A NEGATIVE THING, MEANT TO PUNISH;
THE DCA WAS AN EXPRESSION OF COOPERATION BETWEEN
TWO ALLIES. HE WOULD PUSH FOR A HEARING IN THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE. SUCH ACTION WOULD ALSO COMPEL KARAMANLIS
TO SIGN THE GREEK DCA. JAVITS ADDED "I CAN VOTE
FOR THE DCA--NO TROUBLE, BUT IT WOULD BE HARD EVEN
FOR ME TO REVERSE MYSELF ON THE EMBARGO."

12. FOLLOWING A SHORT DISCUSSION OF POSSIBILITIES
FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY,
ECEVIT RETURNED TO SUBJECT OF DCA. HE TOLD JAVITS
THAT WHEN HE HAD COME TO POWER THE USG HAD ASKED
HIM WHETHER IT SHOULD GO AHEAD ON THE AGREEMENT.
HE HAD REPLIED "YES, BUT THE AGREEMENT IS
INSUFFICIENT." THIS WAS BECAUSE IT DID NOT HAVE
"DEFENSE SUPPORT" AND IGNORED ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.
HE HAD AGREED, HOWEVER, TO GO AHEAD IF THERE
COULD BE SUPPLEMENTARY ARRANGEMENTS LATER. THE
AMERICANS, HOWEVER, HAD NOT YET GIVEN HIM ANY CONCRETE
HOPE FOR SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT. FURTHERMORE, THE
STATE DEPARTMENT HAD TOLD THE PREVIOUS TURKISH GOVERN-
MENT THERE WOULD BE HEARINGS IN DECEMBER. THEN IT
HAD TOLD THE ECEVIT GOVERNMENT HEARINGS WOULD BE
IN MARCH. THE LATEST CHANGE HE COMPLAINED WAS TO APRIL 4 AND
SUBSEQUENTLY TO APRIL 6. THE TURKS UNDERSTOOD THAT
THEY WERE NEAR A DEADLINE. THERE MUST BE ACTION
THIS SPRING (NOTE: APPARENTLY REFERRING TO AMERICAN
POLITICAL IMPERATIVES). HE ASKED IF JAVITS HAD SEEN
GEN. HAIG'S RECENT STRONG STATEMENT. WHEN JAVITS
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NODDED ASSENT ECEVIT SAID THAT WAS THE KIND OF
STATEMENT THAT WAS NEEDED.

13. JAVITS SUMMED UP THAT ON THIS RETURN HE WOULD
SEE THE PRESIDENT AND TALK TO HIM ABOUT TURKISH-
AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE NECESSITY OF IMMEDIATE
ACTION ON THE DCA. FOLLOWING HEARINGS IN THE HOUSE,
HE WOULD SEE ABOUT GETTING HEARINGS STARTED IN THE
SENATE. HE WOULD PRESS AS SOON AS PANAMA WAS OUT
OF THE WAY. THE FINAL DEADLINE FOR THAT VOTE WAS
APRIL 26 BUT IT WAS PROBABLE THAT IT WOULD BE TWO
WEEKS EARLIER. THE ADMINISTRATION MUST BE AS STRONG
AS GEN. HAIG (ECEVIT INTERJECTED THAT HE AGREED BUT
THAT HE HAD LITTLE FAITH THAT IT WOULD BE). JAVITS
CONTINUED "I HOPE THAT WHEN YOU SEE THE ADMINISTRA-
TION MOVING ON THE DCA, YOU WILL CHANGE YOUR VIEW
ON LACK OF CONFIDENCE. I WOULD ADD ONE CAVEAT: I
HOPE YOU WILL NOT FIND IT NECESSARY TO RAISE

QUESTION OF DEFENSE SUPPORT BEFORE THE PASSAGE OF THE DCA. THE DCA CAN BE TREATED AS A BROAD QUESTION OF SUPPORT FOR AN ALLY BUT THERE MUST BE NO STIPULATION OF ADDITIONAL HELP IN ADVANCE. ONCE THE DCA IS PASSED, MORE HELP IS POSSIBLE IN THE CONTEXT OF TWO COOPERATING ALLIES.

14. THE CONVERSATION CLOSED WITH ECEVIT DESCRIBING CONSIDERATIONS THAT HAD GONE INTO HIS DECISION TO ORDER THE CYPRUS INVASION AND PARTICULARLY THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT HAD GONE INTO ORDERING THE SECOND TURKISH THRUST. HE SHOWED JAVITS A COPY OF LETTER SIGNED BY HOUSE WHIP JOHN BRADEMAM SAYING THAT HE COULD ACCEPT THE INITIAL TURKISH LANDING BUT NOT THE SUBSEQUENT TURKISH BREAKOUT FOLLOWING A CEASE FIRE WHEN A LARGE PORTION OF NORTHERN CYPRUS HAD BEEN TAKEN. DRAWING A MAP ON THE TABLE ECEVIT EXPLAINED THAT THE TURKISH TROOPS HAD BEEN
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IN A NARROW CORRIDOR BETWEEN KYRENIA AND NICOSIA. IN THE GENEVA TALKS IN AUGUST 1974 TURKS HAD TRIED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY MUST HAVE A BROAD DEMILITARIZED ZONE AROUND THEIR TROOPS IN THAT CORRIDOR WHILE TALKS CONTINUED. THEIR MESSAGE HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY THE BRITISH OR GREEKS DESPITE SECRETARY KISSINGER'S HELP, HOWEVER, AND THIS FACT COUPLED WITH THEIR KNOWLEDGE THAT TURK CYPRIOTS WERE BEING MASSACRED IN VILLAGES TO THE EAST IN THE LARGE TRIANGLE BETWEEN THE CORRIDOR AND FAMAGUSTA HAD PROMPTED THE SECOND TURKISH OPERATION TURKISH FEARS SUBSEQUENTLY WERE BORNE OUT BY THE DISCOVERY OF MASS GRAVES. HE HAD FOUND THAT EVEN KARAMANLIS DID NOT UNDERSTAND THIS, BUT HE HAD HAD AN OPPORTUNITY AT MONTREUX TO EXPLAIN. HE ADDED THAT THE GREEK AND GREEK CYPRIOTS WITH WHOM TURKS HAD FOUGHT HAD ALSO BEEN USING U.S. WEAPONS SUPPLIED TO GREECE FOR NATO PURPOSES.

15. COMMENT: SENATOR JAVITS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOT SPEAKING FOR ADMINISTRATION, BUT AS SENIOR SENATOR ON SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. ECEVIT, WHO OBVIOUSLY TOOK JAVITS' REMARKS VERY SERIOUSLY, WAS RESTRAINED AND UNEMOTIONAL THROUGHOUT.
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